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Abstract 
In April, 2014, the cabinet reexamined the 3 general rules of arms export and they approved these 3 general rules of 
arms armament transfer. In addition, with the GDP calculation method being revised in December 2016, this amount is 
expected to increase further. The purpose of this study is to propose the framework of defense spending for the next 
phase, since as of current, Japan is no longer able to contain its defense spending within 1 % ratio to GDP.  
This study is unique in a sense that this is the first ever research to analyze the economic model regarding the lifting of 
ban on Japanese arms export in 2014, that used Leontief’s industry related analysis that was originally created to 
analyze disarmament. We would like to propose its halt index by analyzing the economic model.  
As one method of effective implementation, we propose to set a new criterion of “shy away from setting both index of 
power of dispersion and index of sensitivity above 1”, and strategize economic policy and defense policy under this 
premise. 
Keywords: within 1% framework of the nominal GDP, halt index, input-output table, index of sensitivity, index of 
power of dispersion 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
In April, 2014, the cabinet reexamined the 3 general rules of arms export (The prohibition of the weapon export to the 
Communist bloc countries, the country prohibited by United Nation resolution, and the country concerned of the 
international dispute), and they approved these 3 general rules of arms armament transfer. Accordingly, under the new 
general rule, Japan is now able to export arms which, in turn, signifies the de facto lifting of a ban on arms export. 
According to the “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2015” (WMEAT) report of U.S. Department of 
State, between 2002 and 2012 (10-year period), Japan ranked No. 1 in the world as the nation with the largest amount of 
arms import (survey object: 170 countries). This finding also points to the fact that Japanese defense industry is still at 
the state of infancy. In terms of imports, Japan relied heavily on imports from the U.S, and for the rest of defense 
armaments, Japan managed to cover mostly on their own. In terms of Japanese defense industry’s arms export, prior to 
2014, it barely exported small-sized arms made for private sectors as its main exporting sectors.   
When you exclude imports from the U.S., it is safe to say that Japanese defense market prior to 2014 was at the state of 
isolation. Such isolation exposed the problematic issue surrounding the domestic procurement of defense armament. It 
exposed the problem of Japanese defense industry selling arms at an inflated price and producing them at high costs, 
since virtually all of the arms were exclusively being sold to the Self-Defense Forces, added with the fact that 
decision-makers determined the sales price by padding a certain percentage on top of the expenses (note 1). Simply put, 
it was a kind of lax market dominated by a single buyer with no real price competition. 
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Amid such circumstances, the arms ban is expected to bring about growth in the Japanese defense industry. As 
advocated by Ando (2011), this move signifies the start of efficient economic activities in the defense industry. We 
expect the defense industry to grow tenfold under this market efficiency. 
The purpose of this study is not to analyze the growth of defense industry. We will leave that up to our other studies. In 
addition to the lifting of the weapons export ban, the Japanese calculation method of GDP will be revised in December 
2016 and its amount will become larger. The purpose of this study is to propose the framework of defense spending for 
the next phase, since as of current, Japan is no longer able to contain its defense spending within 1 % ratio to GDP. Due 
to the advancement of nuclear armament by North Korea etc., the military environment faced by Japan is becoming 
increasingly tougher. Because of this, depending on the size of GDP, it is possible that a record high 2017 defense 
budget may exceed the framework of 1% ratio to GDP.  With ever expanding defense spending added with the lifted 
ban on arms export, these factors may push defense industry to expand vaguely thorough prioritization of profit. There 
is criticism among some people in Japanese society, saying this will only cause the industry to spiral out of control. 
However, if no one conducts an economic measurement that can serve as a brake, then discussions/debates will stall 
without any further progress, and such condition will further cloud the commitment toward putting on a brake. We 
would like to propose the halt index and its benchmark by analyzing the economic model. We are also creating this halt 
index for the sake of establishing a sound defense industry in Japan. 
This study is unique in a sense that this is the first ever research to analyze the economic model regarding the lifting of 
ban on Japanese arms export in 2014, that used Leontief’s industry related analysis that was originally created to 
analyze disarmament. 
1.2 Preceding Study  
Saal (2001) conducted an econometric analysis of the U.S. defense. He conducted economic analysis on relation 
between defense industry and other industries by measuring the entire productivity elements of the U.S. defense 
industry, and measured the effect its technical progress rate have on “productivity of other industries”. In terms of study 
in Japan, we can refer to Ueno (2015) that discussed on the relation between defense industry and other industries. 
Ueno discussed about the importance of industry related analysis on maritime cluster. It presented ambitious view point 
that actively tried to bring in industry related analysis for defense. Before anything else, it advocated the importance of 
conducting industry related analysis on Japanese defense. 
Although an economic model analysis similar to Saal (2001) can be found here and there in overseas, in Japan, we 
cannot find any study that made empirical analysis of defense industry through the construction of economic model, let 
alone any study on the economic analysis of open arms expert. In the study of Mizuno et al. (2016), instead of analyzing 
the defense industry, they analyzed the utility of government’s defense. They developed the measurement method of 
cardinal utility of government’s defense, and they measured the size of its utilization by the successive cabinets. As the 
result, they were able to measure that government’s utilization tends to score high during the term of prime minister 
with “hawkish” ideology. However, this study stopped short of analyzing private sector defense and effect of lifted ban 
on arms export.  
Ando (2011) stated that economic efficiency can be achieved through an exchange of research developments between 
the defense industry and private sector. If we regard such study as the first half, then we can regard this study as the 
second half. Ando (2011) advocated that Japanese defense industry should become more open. Following Ando’s study, 
in 2014, a ban was lifted on arms export and in effect created open defense industry. Thus, in this study, we will discuss 
about a type of moderation required to properly navigate through these changes from numerical perspective. 
2. Current State of Japan 
The FY 2015 defense budget was ¥4.9801 trillion and within the 1% framework of the nominal FY 2015 GDP of ¥500.5 
trillion. The defense spending for FY 2016 was ¥5.541 trillion and was within the 1% framework of the nominal GDP 
of ¥511.5 trillion (July 2016 cabinet announcement of government outlook). By contrast, the government’s FY 2017 
defense spending demand is ¥5.16 trillion and considering the rather delicate situation, it remains to be seen whether the 
spending will fit the 1% of GDP ratio. However, since the defense spending of ¥211 billion was posted under the FY 
2015 supplementary budget, the FY 2015 defense spending exceeded 1% of actual GDP with a cost of ¥5.1911 trillion 
(note 2).  
When referring to domestic defense industry, some of the major manufactures are, amongst others, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, Kawasaki and Mitsubishi Electric Corp. The total transaction amount between the entire defense industry and 
Ministry of Defense is published in the defense yearbook. Arthur (1991) asserted that Japanese defense industry in the 90’s 
did not possess technological capability that can compete at global level.  If this is the continued state, it means that these 
corporations and domestic industry cannot keep up with the increased amount of government’s defense spending. 
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Although a less known fact, Japan has been exporting arms prior to 2014. It has been exporting hunting guns and 
ammunitions geared toward private sectors to countries like U.S., Belgium, and France, and in terms of its scale, it 
stands 9th in the world (The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva) (note 3). Its data is shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Export performance of Japanese small-sized arms Unit: U.S. $ 1 million (note 4) 
Sakurabayashi (2010; p.162) stated that in times of peace, nations should hone technological development capabilities. 
Putting aside the issue of right and wrong, since Japan is not embroiled in the conflict of war in recent years, the nation 
is at an opportune state to further develop its defense industry. Due to the increased amount of arms export and its high 
demand, we can see the technological improvement in Japanese defense industry, when compared to the 90’s as 
mentioned by Alexander (1991). 
3. Input-Output Table 
3.1 Creation of 4×4 Integrated Input-Output Tables  
To make relation between defense industry and other industries more visible, we have created 4×4 integrated 
input-output table that includes defense division. (Note 5) Along with creating defense division, we integrated it with 
primary industry, secondary industry, and third industry.   
Since a “defense” sector was originally not listed in the input-output table, we created a defense division in addition to 
“agricultural forestry industries and fishers,” “manufacturing,” and “others” (including mining, construction, and other 
unidentified categories). 
Upon creating defense division, we first created 5×5 input-output table by separating “defense industry” from 
manufacturing division, and by separating “public defense division” from “others” division. “Public defense” refers to 
the defense related spending used by the Ministry of Defense in purchasing arms from manufacturing industry. Since 
these affairs are being processed under the sector “public duty”, we separated the defense related spending portion from 
“others” division and called it “public defense”. Accordingly, we integrated defense industry and public defense, and 
listed as 4×4 input-output table as shown in table 1. 
This table 1 serves as input-output table that includes creation of defense division. Defense industry is not included in 
the manufacture division of table 1. Third industry, mining industry, construction industry and unidentified categories 
are included under “others” division, but “public defense” that was supposed to be included under “others” is not 
included. It is because the sector that integrated defense industry and public defense is listed under defense division 
shown in figure 1. 
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Table 1. Work Procedure 2 (creation of 4×4) 
  
Agricultural 
forestry 
industries and 
fishers 
Manufacture 
industry 
Defense 
Others (mining 
industry, 
construction, 
and others) 
Total final 
demand 
Domestic 
production  
Agricultural forestry 
industries and 
fishers 
q11 q12 q13 q14 q1, 0 z1 
Manufacture 
industry 
q21 q22 q23 q24 q2, 0 z2 
Defense industry 
(Manufacture 
industry) 
q31 q32 q33 q34 q3, 0 z3 
Others q41 q42 q43 q44 q4, 0 z4 
Added value A1 A2 A3 A4   
Domestic production  z1 z2 z3 z4   
q11, ..., q44: intermediate demands 
q1, 0, ..., q4, 0: final demands 
z1, ..., z4: Domestic production 
A1, ..., A4: Added value 
3.2 2013 Input-Output Table 
We actually created table 2 by using 2013 Japanese defense data and industry related extended table. The end result is 
the creation of 4×4 input-output table that included defense division. 
Table 2. 2013 Input-Output Table (Title, Unit, ¥ 1 million) 
  
Agricultural 
forestry 
industries and 
fishers 
Manufacture 
industry 
Defense Others 
Total 
intermediate 
sectors 
Total final 
demand  
Domestic 
production  
Agricultural 
forestry 
industries and 
fishers 
1,483,025 7,962,695 0 1,501,408 10,947,128 1,204,900 12,152,028 
Manufacture 
industry  
2,900,787 139,419,561 1,116,714 72,963,350 216,400,412 70,714,210 287,114,622 
Defense  0 982,817 2,030,932 4,737,350 7,751,099 -777,816 6,973,283 
Others  1,951,561 56,886,815 1,122,877 173,297,636 233,258,889 400,949,634 634,208,523 
Total 
intermediate 
sectors 
6,335,373 205,251,888 4,270,523 252,499,744       
Total added 
gross value  
5,816,655 81,862,734 2,702,760 381,708,779       
Domestic 
production  
12,152,028 287,114,622 6,973,283 634,208,523       
Source of defense data: Bouei Nenkan Kankokai, Ed. (2016) 
The breakdown of the −¥777816 million of the defense division’s final demand is as follows: increase/decrease of 
inventory = −¥5299 million (actual value: 2013 industry-related extended table)/export of small-scale arms = ¥2.2274 
million (actual value: United Nations)/import =－¥796169 million (estimation: calculated using the same ratio as 
imports for manufacturing industry). We calculated the input coefficient from our input-output table. It refers to the 
input coefficient matrix of the 4 × 4 division. (note 6) 
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Table 3. 2013 Input Coefficient Matrix 
0.1220 0.0277 0 0.0023 
0.2387 0.4855 0.1601 0.1150 
0 0.0034 0.2912 0.0074 
0.1605 0.1981 0.1610 0.2732 
Next, when we calculated the Leontief inverse matrix by using table 3, it came out as shown in table 4.  
Table 4. 2013 Leontief Inverse Matrix 
1.16 0.06838 0.01881 0.0148 
0.6374 2.114 0.5554 0.3424 
0.00763 0.01648 1.419 0.01721 
0.4319 0.5951 0.4699 1.476 
4. Simulation Analysis 
4.1 Effect of Arms Export  
By using the Leontief inverse matrix obtained in the above, we calculated the effect final demand (including defense 
division) have on other divisions. 2014 export performance of “military” arms (with lifted ban) was $475899 (note 7), 
which amounts to ¥50 million under yen conversion rate in 2014. We will calculate its effect on each division by using 
Leontief inverse matrix. 
Table 5. Effect on Production of Arms Export (¥ 1 million) Actual Value in 2014 
Agricultural forestry industries and fishers 0.9  
Manufacture industry 27.8  
Defense 71.0  
Others  23.5  
It brought the effect of ¥71 million to the defense, and when you add it vertically, it brings the total effect of ¥ 123．2 
million. When you combine it with the export amount of final demand ¥50 million, it brought economic effect of ¥173.2 
million to the Japanese economy. 
4.2 Simulation  
1) Simulation 1 
The arms export amount of Korea in 2013 is $ 235 million (note 8), and if you convert it with the yen rate in 2013, it 
amounts to ¥ 22936 million. This amount is almost identical to Japan, since Japan already exported small-sized arms 
worth $ 22274 million in the same year.  
However, now that ban has been lifted for arms export, what kind of economic effect will it have if Japan adds the arms 
export amount equal to the amount of Korea. We will calculate the effect on each division by using the Leontief inverse 
matrix by assuming the final demand of defense division as ¥ 22936 million.  
Table 6. Effect on Production of Arms Export (¥ 1 million) Case of 2013 
Agricultural forestry industries and fishers 431  
Manufacturing industry 12739  
Defense  32546  
Others  10778  
When combining it with the export amount of final demand of ¥22936 million, it has economic effect of ¥79430 million. 
It entails the same level of defense spending effect as Korea. 
2) Simulation 2  
Germany (3rd) and France (4th) in 2015 were $2049 million and $2013 million, respectively. What kind of effect will it 
have, if Japan becomes a superpower of defense industry and is able to compete neck and neck against these kinds of 
countries after the lifting of ban on arms exports? 
Germany’s $2049 million equals ¥247929 million, if you convert it with the yen rate in 2015. 
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Table 7. Effect on Production of Arms Export (¥ 1 million) Case of 2013 
Agricultural forestry industries and fishers 4664  
Manufacture industry 137700  
Defense 351811  
Others 116502  
When combining it with the export amount of final demand of ¥247929 million, it has the economic effect of ¥858605 
million. As you can see, the effect is significant when the defense spending is at the scale of Germany. 
5. Index of Power of Dispersion and Index of Sensitivity 
5.1 2013 Index of Power of Dispersion and Index of Sensitivity 
We calculated the index of power of dispersion and the index of sensitivity by using table 3 input coefficient. (note 9). 
Table 8. Index of Power of Dispersion 
Agricultural forestry industries and fishers 0.9575 
Manufacture industry 1.1959 
Defense  1.0536 
Others  0.792 
Table 9. Index of Sensitivity 
Agricultural forestry industries and fishers 0.5402 
Manufacture industry 1.562 
Defense 0.6251 
Others 1.2725 
Index of power of dispersion has an effect on national economy if it scores above 1, and no effect if it scores below 1. 
Defense does not have any effect on national economy or other industries. Index of sensitivity has an effect on national 
economy if it scores above 1, and no effect if it scores below 1. Defense industry is not affected by the national 
economy. Based on this interpretation, both coefficients scored below 1 for the Japanese defense industry, which means 
that the defense industry has a small influence of the national economy picture and the national economy has a small 
influence on defense industry at the same time. 
5.2 “Guns and Butter” and Halt Index 
When interpreting “guns and butter”, the conventional wisdom interprets it as “guns or butter”, a criterion of either 
prioritizing military spending or prioritizing public welfare. However, under today’s situation where there are intimate 
connections between industries, there is a potential to interpret it as “guns and butter”. In other words, it is saying that 
profits generated from guns production will spread across other industries and will eventually enable citizens to buy 
butter. In light of this, let us now separate this situation by using index of power of dispersion and index of sensitivity.  
Case 1: When the index of power of dispersion and index of sensitivity are less than one, guns production will not lead 
to butter. 
Case 2: When only the index of power of dispersion is greater than one, guns production will help citizens buy butter. 
Case 3: When only the index of sensitivity is greater than one, citizens need to buy butter to produce guns. 
Case 4: When the index of power of dispersion and index of sensitivity are both greater than one, there is a reciprocal 
interaction between guns and butter and both prosper if either is being sold. 
As shown in the above, we were able to show the relation between military industry and national economy through the 
numerical value of index of power of dispersion and index of sensitivity. We believe these findings will serve as an 
important index regarding the lifting of ban on arms export. So far, Japanese defense industry has resulted in 
galapagosization due to years of unhealthy practice of having Defense Agency as its sole buyer.  If Japanese defense 
industry is able to promote arms export in coming years and be included as part of the global economic mechanism and 
not just domestic economy, we believe these index values will undergo transformation.  If we leave the condition as 
“index of power of dispersion and index of sensitivity are both below 1”, even if the over excited defense industry are 
remonstrated, we can still minimize its effect on national economy. However, if it becomes “index of power of 
dispersion and index of sensitivity are both above 1”, it will create a state in which it will cause a material effect on 
national economy just by adding a small restriction on defense industry. 
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Figure 2. Index of Power of Dispersion and Index of Sensitivity 
Chart 1 (It is a chart with (1,1) as the starting point. Currently, it is the point on the second quadrant) 
Choosing the quadrant in which the numerical values in Table 10 should be placed is not only the government’s but also 
the people’s responsibility (in other words, deciding the placement of a halt standard between the quadrants). Our 
proposal is that, at present, it should be maintained in the range between the second and fourth quadrant. The 
benchmarks are as follows. 
    Case1: NG 
Case2: OK 
Case3: OK 
Case4: OK 
This is because the defense industry begins succeeding and integrating with the national economy and positioning itself 
on the first quadrant, which supports the Japanese economy, even though such a positioning will produce economic 
significance. This will also mean that the defense industry will spiral out of control. 
However, a point as close as possible to the first quadrant is desirable because it positively influences the economy from 
an economic efficiency viewpoint. The coexistence of the halt and economic efficiency are also necessary. 
Table 10. Halt Index of Arms Export 
Third 
quadrant 
Index of power of dispersion<1, Index 
of sensitivity <1 
Isolation of defense industry  
Fourth 
quadrant 
Index of power of dispersion<1, Index 
of sensitivity>1 
National economy is causing 
effect to defense economy 
Second 
quadrant 
Index of power of dispersion>1, Index 
of sensitivity<1 
Defense economy is causing 
effect to national economy  
First 
quadrant 
Index of power of dispersion≧1, 
Index of sensitivity≧1 
Defense industry and national 
economy are having significant 
effect on each other 
6. Summary 
In addition to the lifting of the ban on weapons export, the calculation method of GDP will be revised in this year and 
its amount is expected to become larger. It is highly likely that the benchmark of the 1% of GDP for expenditure in the 
defense budget will lose significance. For Japan to not have military power at the time of World War II, a new 
benchmark is necessary. It cannot set a new benchmark using a decimal system with 1%. Moreover, it is important to 
account for economic theory in the process. Thus, the defense industry is likely to be associated with economic growth. 
In this study, we demonstrated a reasonable benchmark that could be supported by society and economic theory. For 
decades, predecessors have executed economic and defense policies under the premise of protecting the framework of 1% 
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of GDP (note 10). Given that the ban on arms export has been lifted, defense spending is likely to exceed the 1% of 
GDP depending on the size of GDP in the coming years. In light of this, as a method of effective implementation, we 
propose to set a new criterion, “shy away from setting both index of power of dispersion and index of sensitivity greater 
than one,” and strategize economic and defense policies under this premise. 
We calculated the index of power of dispersion and sensitivity for real defense using data for 2013. In the future, we 
will perform an analysis of the dynamics using time series data to measure whether the index of power of dispersion 
and sensitivity is less than the benchmark and how can the defense industry make a lower contribute to the Japanese 
economy than the benchmark. 
Addendum 
We used Actualitix statistics for military data. 
・Statistics of Japan’s export of small-scale arms is based on data by the United Nations: 
http://ja.actualitix.com/country/jpn/ja-japan-arms-export.php 
・Military arms: 
http://ja.actualitix.com/country/jpn/ja-japan-military-arms-export.php 
We used IMF data for the conversion rate of yen: 
http://www.principalglobalindicators.org/?sk=388DFA60-1D26-4ADE-B505-A05A558D9A42 
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Notes 
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI [Grant Number 15K13024]. All remaining errors are the authors’. 
Note 1. Sakurabayashi (2013; p. 170) highlighted the issues surrounding defense purchase in Japan. Since there is no 
market price, a certain profit margin is posted on cost. Manufactures do not make the effort to reduce costs since this 
would means reduced profits; thus, buyers must purchase it at a higher price. 
Note 2. “Supplementary budget is nothing more than extraordinary military spending account” (Toyo Keizai Online, 
Article by Kiyotani, S., January 26, 2015). http://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/58914T 
Note 3. “Japan ranks higher as a small-scale arms export nation. Its global total trade amount has doubled in six years” 
(The Sankei Shimbun, August 28, 2012). 
Note 4. Data for Japanese arms export are by the United Nations. 
Note 5. For integration, we referenced Nakamura (2000; pp. 103-109) and Mizuno (2016). 
Note 6. We referenced Nidaira (2008; pp. 34-43). 
Note 7. This is based on United Nation data for Actualitix. 
Note 8. Arms export data for Korea, Germany, and France are from World Bank data. 
Note 9. Our calculation follows Fujikawa (2005; pp. 119-121). 
Note 10. The method measuring Japanese GDP will be revised in December 2016. 
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